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Introduction
The majority of corporations around the world are under the control, or at least the
significant influence, of large shareholders, typically their founding families. Even in the United
States, where ownership dispersion is arguably at its greatest, more than half of all publicly
traded companies are “family firms,” defined as those in which a company’s founder or a
member of his family by blood or marriage is an officer, director, or blockholder (Anderson and
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2009, 2010). Founding families frequently wish to
realize objectives beyond maximizing economic value for both family and non-family
shareholders. Examples of such objectives include, among others, preserving the founder’s
legacy and heritage, creating employment opportunities for family members, and maintaining
family harmony and social status. Additionally, families are often large shareholders or vote
holders in these firms and are shielded from the short-run pressures of the stock market through
control-enhancing mechanisms such as dual-class stock, enabling family members to exert
substantial influence on the decision-making processes within these companies.
One domain in which a family firm, especially one that is family-managed, may be able
to pursue the family’s unique preferences is in its corporate strategic decision-making,
particularly its divestiture decision-making. We argue that founding families’ historical
connections to their firms reduces the likelihood that family firms will undertake divestitures,
consistent with findings from existing research (Chung and Luo, 2008; Zellweger and Brauer,
2013; Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). We extend this logic by arguing that because only family
firms, and not their non-family counterparts, experience these family-specific preferences against
divestitures, the value a given divestiture creates for a family firm must exceed the value it
creates for a non-family firm in order for that deal even to be undertaken in the first place. This
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implies that divestitures undertaken by family firms will create more value for these companies
than do the divestitures undertaken by non-family firms. This effect should be stronger in family
firms that are run by founding family members, since the interests of family managers are
especially closely connected to the firms they oversee.
We test these predictions using a hand-collected database consisting of detailed
information on the divestiture activity and family ownership and control of 30,143 firm-year
observations from 2,110 companies between 1994 and 2010. We first confirm that family firms
are indeed less likely to undertake divestitures than non-family firms, particularly when the CEO
is a member of the founding family. Then, consistent with our arguments, we establish that firm
value is higher when divestitures are undertaken by family rather than non-family firms, and
especially so when family firms are run by family-CEOs rather than non-family CEOs.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the dependent variable of interest in our study is the
value created for a firm’s shareholders by a given divestiture (not the value of the divested
assets). As such, in our empirical tests, we carefully account for three factors that could distort
the observed relationship between divestitures and firm value: we employ coarsened exact
matching models to deal with the issue of non-random selection in the divestiture decision; we
use the first-differenced value of Tobin’s q as the dependent variable in these coarsened exact
matching models to minimize the effects of time-invariant, firm-specific, unobservable factors
on the relationship between divestitures and firm value; and we implement event studies to
isolate investors’ immediate reactions to divestiture announcements, which reduces the effects of
any ex ante differences that might exist between the traits of family and non-family firms. The
fact that we find support for our predictions regarding the relatively greater value created by
divestitures undertaken by family (and family-CEO) firms using these rigorous methodologies
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suggests that the core mechanism driving our results is the distinctive preferences of founding
families, since our empirical approaches rule out both the observable and unobservable sources
of bias that could constitute alternative explanations to this interpretation. We also provide
descriptive evidence in support of this point by showing that the shareholder value created by
divestitures declines in the generation of a given company’s family ownership and management.
This reveals that the family firms and family managers that exhibit the strongest preferences
against divestitures enjoy the highest returns when they do undertake these deals.
The research in this study bridges the literatures on family business management and
corporate strategy, generating two key theoretical contributions. Our work underscores the
predominance in family firms of agency conflicts between family and non-family shareholders:
the unique preferences of founding families and their ability to act on them appear to manifest
themselves in firms’ corporate strategy decisions and outcomes, illustrating how and why family
firms might fail to fully exploit the economic opportunities that are available to them. Our study
also addresses the questions of when, and for which firms, divestitures create value, and helps
explain the relative scarcity of divestiture activity despite its potential benefits.
Theory and Hypotheses
Agency Problems in Family Firms
The canonical, agency-based model of the modern corporation is one in which the
primary goal of managers (agents) is to maximize value for the shareholders (principals) of the
companies they oversee (Berle and Means, 1932). Agency problems arise in corporations when
self-interested managers instead seek to maximize value for themselves at the expense of their
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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An additional conflict beyond this traditional conceptualization of the agency problem
may occur in firms in which a large shareholder holds an ownership stake alongside a fringe of
small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In such firms, the large shareholder, by virtue of
its controlling ownership stake, may extract “private benefits of control” by maximizing over its
own preferences at the expense of those of small shareholders, a principal-principal conflict.
Family firms are a classic example of this circumstance, in that the families that found
these companies exhibit a unique set of preferences that their controlling ownership stakes (and
often, their roles in management) enable them to pursue (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003;
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The distinctive preferences of family firms, relative to those of nonfamily firms, can be grouped into two broad categories, financial and non-financial.
From a financial standpoint, founding families frequently have long investment and profit
horizons. Accordingly, they may shield themselves from the short-run pressures of the stock
market through control-enhancing mechanisms such as dual-class stock, disproportionate board
representation, pyramids, and voting agreements (Villalonga and Amit, 2009; Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick, 2008; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and
Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Consequently, their control rights often exceed their cash
flow rights, a circumstance that has been shown to be associated with lower firm value
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2009; La Porta et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002).
From a non-financial perspective, founding families are embedded in the firms they
create, often in tacit and intangible ways (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, and
Kintana, 2010). The corporate names of family firms frequently include or are derived from the
surname of the family itself (e.g., Ford, Johnson, Kohler, etc.), reflecting strong identity-based
connections (Dyer and Whetten, 2006), and the management of a family firm may be passed
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down across generations, such that the family’s ways of doing business are preserved (Hall and
Nordqvist, 2008). As such, the family may wish to realize objectives beyond maximizing
economic value for shareholders. Examples of such objectives include, among others, preserving
the founder’s legacy and heritage (Casson, 1999), creating employment opportunities for family
members (Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), behaving responsibly towards
employees and other relevant stakeholders (Stavrou, Kassinis, and Filotheou, 2007; Berrone et
al., 2010; Block, 2010), and maintaining social status in the community (Arregle et al., 2007).
The foregoing discussion indicates that there are a number of dimensions along which the
preferences of family firms may differ from those of non-family firms. Thus, while the primary
objective of both family and non-family firms should, in theory, be to maximize value for all
shareholders, the fact that founding families have this unique set of preferences (along with the
power to pursue them) suggests that family firms may instead make decisions that satisfy the
preferences of the families that found them. As will now be discussed, one important domain in
which this tendency might manifest itself quite strongly is in family firms’ corporate strategic
decision-making, and in particular, its divestiture decision-making.
The Benefits and Costs of Divestitures
Corporate strategy is fundamentally concerned with the question of how a firm can create
value over and above the value its business units create by themselves (Porter, 1987; Goold,
Campbell, and Alexander, 1994; Collis and Montgomery, 1998; Prahalad and Doz, 2003), which,
by definition, involves decisions about where to draw firm boundaries. Diversification has
traditionally been featured quite prominently in this literature: transactions like mergers and
acquisitions, through which diversification is frequently effectuated, are thought to enable firms
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to leverage their core competences and attain synergies across their disparate business units
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Singh and Montgomery, 1987).
Increasingly, however, refocusing activity has come to be viewed as an important part of
corporate strategic decision-making, a point that is underscored by the recent prevalence of
divestitures as a mode of corporate reconfiguration (Davidoff, 2014). Divestitures are believed to
enable firms to reconfigure resources within their corporate portfolios (Capron, Dussauge, and
Mitchell, 1998; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004) and to remove obsolete
or misaligned business units therefrom (Chang, 1996; Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan,
2001). In so doing, divestitures often clarify the perceptions of relevant external stakeholders like
securities analysts, and in turn, shareholders (Zuckerman, 2000; Bergh, Johnson, and DeWitt,
2008; Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga, 2013). As such, the implementation of divestitures like
asset sales and corporate spinoffs has typically been found to be positively associated with firm
value (Markides, 1992, 1995; Bergh, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; John and Ofek, 1995;
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999).
This being said, however, it is not costless for firms to undertake divestitures. In general,
firms undertake fewer divestitures than acquisitions,1 in that the latter are conceptualized as
representing growth and vitality while the former are viewed as signs of weakness and failure
(Dranikoff, Koller, and Schneider, 2002). As such, organizational inertia against divestitures may
be quite high, as evidenced by the empirical findings that these transactions typically follow
management turnover events (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and
Frederickson, 1993; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002) and periods of underperformance (Hoskisson,
Johnson, and Moesel, 1994; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006; Shimizu,
1

For example, the value of U.S. mergers and acquisitions outpaced the value of divestitures nearly twenty to one in
2011. Source: “mergermarket M&A Round-Up for Year End 2011”
http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/Press-Release-for-Financial-Advisers-Year-End-2011.pdf
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2007). Furthermore, divestitures necessitate the separation of shared financial, managerial, and
reputational resources (Woo, Willard, and Daellenbach, 1992; Seward and Walsh, 1996; Corley
and Gioia, 2004; Semadeni and Cannella, 2011), processes that might be organizationally quite
costly and difficult to implement. Further to this point, certain divestitures may disrupt tacit and
taken-for-granted, yet organizationally valuable, competences and interdependencies that have
developed over time within diversified firms, suggesting that the costs of divestitures for
divesting firms can, at times, outweigh their benefits (Feldman, 2014).
Divestitures in Family and Non-Family Firms
In articulating the benefits and costs of divestitures, the foregoing discussion has drawn
no distinction between the divestitures undertaken by family and non-family firms. As
mentioned previously, however, the fact that founding families have unique preferences, along
with the power to pursue them, suggests that divestiture decision-making in family firms may be
quite different from the analogous processes in non-family firms. The core argument advanced in
this study is that these family-specific preferences should impose an additional set of costs on
family firm divestitures, which are expected to reduce the propensity that family firms will
undertake divestitures, relative to that of non-family firms. This implies that when family firms
do undertake divestitures, the value these deals create for the divesting firms will exceed the
value created by divestitures undertaken by non-family firms.
The effect of founding families’ histories within their firms is likely to be the core driver
of their preference to avoid undertaking divestitures. Management and ways of doing business
may be passed down through the generations in family firms (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Hall and
Nordqvist, 2008). Retaining rather than divesting business units may help family firms maintain
these historically-based practices (Feldman, 2014), for example, by creating management roles
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for members of the family’s later generations (Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007) or
by continuing relationships with long-time employees, buyers, and suppliers (Stavrou et al.,
2007; Berrone et al., 2010; Block, 2010). The preservation of the founder’s legacy and heritage
(Casson, 1999) may also play an important role in family firms’ inertia against divestitures. In
family firms, retired family members may remain involved in these companies for a long time
after they step down, whether directly as significant shareholders or board members, or indirectly
as relatives of the succeeding CEOs. As a result, current CEOs of family firms, in general, may
be disinclined to undertake divestitures, as these transactions may reflect negatively on or even
reverse their predecessors’ strategic decisions.
This discussion suggests that due to their family-specific preferences, family firms will
be less likely than non-family firms to undertake divestitures. Consistent with all of above
arguments, family firms have been shown to engage in less divestiture activity than non-family
firms (Zellweger and Brauer, 2013; Sharma and Manikutty, 2005; Chung and Luo, 2008),
especially as their ownership stakes increase (Praet, 2013). Additionally, family firms are less
likely than non-family firms to downsize their workforces (Block, 2010; Stavrou et al., 2007), an
action that is close in spirit to the decision to divest a business.
This being said, however, these family-specific preferences should influence not only the
propensity of family firms to undertake divestitures, but more importantly, the relationship
between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Economically, in non-family firms,
managers should decide to undertake a divestiture only when the benefits (B) of that transaction
exceed its costs (C), such that the net value created for a firm by that divestiture is positive (B –
C > 0). The argument that the benefits associated with a divestiture must exceed the costs of
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implementing it for the deal to be undertaken is consistent with existing findings that divestitures
are positively associated with firm value on average.
In family firms, however, managers should decide to undertake a divestiture only when
the benefits (B) of that transaction exceed the sum of both the generic (C) and the family-specific
(FC) costs of the deal, such that the net value of that divestiture is positive (B – C – FC > 0). By
definition, therefore, the total cost associated with undertaking divestitures must be higher in
family firms (C + FC) than it is in non-family firms (C). This suggests that family firms will only
be willing to divest businesses when the foreseeable benefits of these transactions are high
enough to offset both the generic and the family-specific costs of undertaking them (B > C +
FC), whereas non-family firms will be willing to undertake divestitures when their benefits
exceed their generic costs (B > C). Accordingly, for divestitures to be undertaken in the first
place, the benefits associated with family firm divestitures must exceed those associated with
non-family firm divestitures. This implies that the divestitures undertaken by family firms will be
more positively associated with firm value than those undertaken by non-family firms.
H1: Divestitures will be more positively associated with firm value when they are
undertaken by family firms than when they are undertaken by non-family firms.
Divestitures in Family-Managed and Non-Family Managed Firms
A similar logic to the above discussion helps justify the argument that divestitures
undertaken in family firms run by family-CEOs will be more valuable than those undertaken in
family firms run by non-family CEOs. The heritage-based connections described previously are
quite likely to influence both the divestiture decisions and outcomes of family-CEOs in
particular, whether they are founders or descendants of founders.
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Given the hard work it takes to create, build, and run a company, especially a publiclytraded firm, a founder-CEO may be the last person to realize that the time has come for him to
divest part of the business that he worked to create. Along similar lines, descendant-CEOs may
view themselves as stewards of their family’s heritage, as embodied in the family firm, imposing
a profound sense of responsibility on these individuals not to remove parts of the firms that their
ancestors worked so hard to build. This inertia may be further reinforced by the presence of a
family governance system—increasingly common among business families—that formalizes
descendant-CEOs’ accountability to their families. Furthermore, because family-CEOs are
usually large shareholders in their companies, they have strong financial interests in their firms,
incentivizing them to maximize over the preferences from which they feel they will personally
benefit most significantly, by, for example, avoiding divestitures. By comparison, while a nonfamily CEO may be influenced by the presence of members of the founding family on the board,
as shareholders, or in top management positions, and is likely to have some equity ownership in
his firm, he will not experience the emotional or financial inertia against divestitures as
personally or as acutely as his family-CEO counterpart.
In addition to their inclination to avoid divestitures, family-CEOs may also have
significant power to put those preferences into action. Shareholders only have a direct say on
divestitures (i.e., the right to vote on them at a shareholders’ meeting) in the exceptional case in
which a divestiture constitutes a disposition of materially all assets of the firm. Otherwise, the
ultimate decision rights on divestitures correspond to the board or, de facto, to the CEO himself.
Thus, in a family firm whose CEO is a member of the founding family (whether a founder or a
descendant), that individual will have both the motivation and the power to avoid divestitures.
By contrast, if the CEO of a family firm is not a member of the founding family, the family’s
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reluctance to undertake divestitures may be moderated by the balance of power between
shareholders or board members and the CEO. This suggests that family firms run by familyCEOs will be less likely to divest businesses than family firms run by non-family CEOs.
Thus, while a family firm will undertake a divestiture when the benefits (B) of that
transaction exceed the sum of the generic (C) and the family-specific (FC) costs of the deal,
family-CEOs running family firms will experience these family-specific costs (FC) more acutely
than non-family CEOs, and have the power to respond to them by only undertaking divestitures
when it is valuable enough to do so. Accordingly, the foreseeable benefits of divestitures
undertaken by family-CEOs managing family firms must be high enough to offset the familyspecific costs of divesting a business unit. This implies that the divestitures undertaken in family
firms run by family-CEOs should be more valuable than their non-family counterparts.2
H2: Within family firms, divestitures will be more positively associated with firm
value when they are undertaken by family-CEOs than when they are undertaken
by non-family-CEOs.
Methods
Sample and Data
The sample used in this paper consists of 30,143 firm-year pairs pertaining to 2,110
publicly-traded U.S. companies from 1994 to 2010, and was constructed as follows.
The baseline sample of companies used in this paper comes from the sample in
Villalonga and Amit (2010), which consisted of the 8,104 firms that were active in the year
2000. Due to the intensive nature of gathering information on family control, data on the identity
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We leave open as an empirical question the issue of whether the divestitures undertaken by founder-CEOs are
more or less valuable than those undertaken by descendant-CEOs because it is not obvious, ex ante, for which type
of CEO the family-specific costs of divestitures will be higher, and hence, for which type of CEO the value created
by these transactions will be greater.
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of the founder and family relationships among shareholders were only collected for a random
subsample of 2,110 firms out of those 8,104. These data were manually gathered from proxy
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), corporate histories
extracted from Hoover’s, company websites, and Internet searches. The randomization was
carried out within industries so as to ensure a minimum degree of representation within each
industry (20% for three-digit level industries and 25% for two-digit level industries).
For this paper, we built a panel out of the cross-sectional sample of 2,110 firms in
Villalonga and Amit (2010) by collecting analogous family control information about those
companies going back to 1994 (the first year for which proxy statements are electronically
available), and going forward until 2010.3 The resulting panel dataset, consisting of 30,143 firmyear pairs from 1994 to 2010 for 2,110 companies, is the most comprehensive random sample of
U.S. corporations that has been used thus far in research on family firms.
The ownership data for these 2,110 companies were supplemented with detailed data on
the divestitures they undertook between 1994 and 2010. Specifically, these data consist of
information on every divestiture undertaken by each firm in the sample, the mode of divestiture
(sell-off or spinoff)4, and the dollar value of each transaction. Divestiture data were collected
from SDC Platinum, Mergers & Acquisitions Magazine, the CCH Capital Changes Reporter, and
the Federal Trade Commission Statistical Report on Mergers.

3

Because the group of firms that were active in the year 2000 was extended backwards to 1994 and forwards to
2010, certain firms may have entered our sample after 1994 (but before the year 2000), and other firms may have
exited the sample before 2010 (but after the year 2000). Thus, it could be the case that these two subsets of firms differ in systematic ways from the firms that remained in the sample from 1994 to 2010. To confirm that this was not
the case, we conducted t-tests of the difference in Tobin’s q between two pairs of firms: (1) entering firms in their
post-1994 but pre-2000 entry years versus all other firm-year pairs from 1994 to 2000; and (2) exiting firms in their
post-2000 but pre-2010 exit years versus all other firm-year pairs from 2000 to 2010. Neither t-test was significant,
suggesting that selection bias from firm entry and exit is not an issue.
4
Sell-offs are defined as the sale of a business unit to another organization. Spinoffs are defined as the pro-rata distribution of shares in an existing subsidiary or business segment to the shareholders of the divesting firm.
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Among the control variables, CEO turnover data were gathered from ExecuComp and
Equilar, and for missing observations, hand-collected from firms’ proxy statements.5 Similarly,
firm age data were gathered from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Professor
Jay Ritter’s online database of initial public offering ages,6 and for missing observations, handcollected from firms’ SEC filings, Hoover’s, the International Directory of Company Histories,7
and other online research. Finally, data on mergers and acquisitions were gathered from SDC
Platinum, and all financial data were gathered from Compustat and CRSP.
Family Control
This paper uses three measures of family control. “Family firms” are defined as those in
which the founder or a member of his family by blood or marriage is an officer, director, or
blockholder, either individually or as a group (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit,
2006, 2009, 2010). “Family-CEO firms” are those firms whose CEO is the founder or a member
of the founding family. Within family firms, “non-family-CEO firms” are those that are not
managed by the founder or any member of the founding family. Family-CEO firms are split into
two categories: “Founder-CEO firms” are those in which the CEO is the company’s founder,
regardless of whether other family members of the same or later generations, serve as officers or
directors in the firm. “Descendant-CEO firms” are those in which the CEO is a descendant of the
founder. Table I shows the extent of family management, by family generation, in our sample.
-----Table I here----Divestiture Activity
Panel A of Table II presents descriptive information on the number, value, and mode of
divestitures undertaken by the firms in the sample, broken down according to whether the
5

Accessed online through www.sec.gov/edgar
Accessed online through http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
7
Accessed online through www.fundinguniverse.com
6
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companies were family or non-family firms in the year of the divestiture. Family firms undertook
significantly fewer divestitures overall than non-family firms; between 1994 and 2010, they
divested an average of 2.79 businesses (worth an average of $1.1m each), as compared to the
4.58 businesses (worth an average $2.6m each) divested by non-family firms.
Panel B of Table II disaggregates the divestiture activity of family firms according to
whether these companies were managed by family-CEOs, non-family CEOs, founder-CEOs, or
descendant-CEOs. Family firms that are managed by non-family CEOs undertake divestitures
more frequently (4.26 divestitures worth an average of $1.9m over the sample period) than
family firms that are managed by family-CEOs (2.33 divestitures worth an average of $1m). The
difference is pronounced for founder-CEOs, who undertake an average of 2.02 divestitures worth
$0.9m each, but is still significant relative to descendant-CEOs (3.39 divestitures worth an
average of $1m). The t-statistics for the differences between these pairs of mean values appear in
Panel C of Table II: while the differences in the numbers of divestitures are significant, the
differences in the value of these transactions are not. These results provide initial support for the
idea that family-managed firms divest businesses less frequently than their non-family peers.
-----Table II here----Variables
Table III describes the main variables used in this study. The variable we use to test a
firm’s propensity to undertake divestitures is Divestiture, an indicator variable that takes the
value one if a firm undertakes at least one divestiture in a given year, and zero if not.
Our measure of firm value is Tobin’s q, the ratio of the firm’s market value to the
replacement cost of its assets. Market value is the value of common equity plus the book value of
preferred stock and debt, and the replacement cost of assets is proxied by their actual book value.
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In terms of control variables, CEO Turnover is an indicator variable taking the value one
in years in which a company’s CEO differs from its CEO in the previous year. Firm Age is the
number of years elapsed since a firm’s founding date. Measuring firm size, ln(Total Sales) is the
natural log of a firm’s total sales. Leverage is calculated as the sum of short- and long-term debt
scaled by market capitalization, measuring a firm’s indebtedness. Current Ratio, defined as a
firm’s current assets over its current liabilities, measures the cash constraints a firm faces. Along
similar lines, Negative Net Income is an indicator variable taking the value one if a firm has
negative net income, representing the most financially-constrained firms. Diversification is a
count of the number of business segments in which a firm operates in a given year. Number of
M&A is a count of the number of mergers and acquisitions undertaken by a firm in a given year.
Finally, Industry Sales Growth is defined as the average sales growth rate of all single-segment
firms operating in the main four-digit SIC code in which each company in the sample operates.
Table IV presents descriptive statistics on the financial characteristics of the firms in the
sample. These statistics are measured in the individual year prior to each divestiture these
companies undertake. Family firms are significantly smaller than their non-family counterparts
in terms of both assets and sales; they are also less levered and operate in fewer business
segments (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Despite these differences, however, the mean Tobin’s q
of family and non-family firms in the year prior to the divestitures these companies undertake are
not significantly different from one another.
-----Tables III and IV here----Methodologies
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that the divestitures undertaken by family firms will be more
positively associated with firm value than those undertaken by non-family firms, especially in
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family firms managed by family-CEOs. We have argued that the mechanism driving these
differences is the family-specific costs associated with divestitures, which necessitate that family
firm (and family-CEO) divestitures create more value than their non-family counterparts in order
for them even to be undertaken in the first place.
To isolate the existence of the family-specific costs associated with divestitures as the
core mechanism driving our results, it is necessary to rule out the effects of three confounding
factors. First, the fact that family firms and family-CEOs may divest business units in response
to particular exigencies suggests that non-random selection among the firms that choose to
undertake divestitures could influence their performance consequences. Second, time-invariant,
unobservable, firm-specific characteristics could be correlated with the relationship between
divestitures and firm value. Third, the pre-divestiture performance of family and family-CEO
firms could differ systematically from that of their non-family peers, which could explain any
post-divestiture performance differences between these types of firms. We use coarsened exact
matching models with a first-differenced dependent variable to account for the first two of these
problems (Heckman et al., 1998), and event studies to account for the third issue.
Results
Coarsened Exact Matching Models
We begin by estimating the relationship between divestitures and firm value using
coarsened exact matching models with a first-differenced dependent variable. In coarsened exact
matching models, a first-stage regression is fitted to predict each firm’s “propensity” to
undertake an action (here, divesting a business), which is considered the “treatment.” Firms that
undertake the action are considered as the “treated” group, whereas those that do not undertake it
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are the control group. The independent variables in this first-stage regression represent the
observable characteristics that are driving firms to undertake divestitures.
The estimated propensities that firms will undertake divestitures (as generated by the
predicted values of the dependent variable in the first-stage regression) are then used as the
independent variable in the second-stage regressions measuring the relationship between
divestitures and firm value. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a first-differenced
measure of firm value (here, Tobin’s q in year t less Tobin’s q in year t-1). This first-differencing
soaks up the effects of any unobservable firm-specific factors that could be driving the
relationship between divestitures and firm value. Thus, coarsened exact matching models with a
first-differenced dependent variable account for the effects of both observable and unobservable
characteristics on the relationship between divestitures and firm value.8
The Propensity of Family Firms to Divest
Our theoretical development suggests that family firms will be less likely than non-family
firms to undertake divestitures, especially when they are run by family-CEOs rather than nonfamily CEOs. Table V presents the results of regressions investigating these predictions. The
dependent variable is Divestiture. All models are specified as logistic regressions and include
the control variables described above. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm.
-----Table V here----In Regression (1), the coefficient on Family Firm is negative and significant at 1%, and
the marginal effect of this coefficient indicates that family firms are 2.1% less likely than nonfamily firms to divest businesses in any given year. Given that about 15% of the firms in our
sample undertake divestitures, this effect appears to be economically meaningful as well.

8

As a robustness check, we also estimate propensity score matching models with a first-differenced dependent variable, and these results are consistent with those generated by our coarsened exact matching models.
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Regression (2) tests the propensity of family firms run by family-CEOs to undertake
divestitures, compared to the propensity of family firms run by non-family CEOs to do so. The
negative and significant coefficient on Family-CEO suggests that family firms run by familyCEOs are 1.5% less likely to undertake divestitures than family firms run by non-family-CEOs.
Regression (3) separately tests the propensities of family firms run by founder-CEOs and
descendant-CEOs to undertake divestitures, both as compared to the propensity of family firms
run by non-family-CEOs to do so. Here, the coefficients on Founder-CEO and Descendant-CEO
are both negative, though only the coefficient on Descendant-CEO is significant; family firms
run by descendant-CEOs are 1.8% less likely to divest businesses than family firms run by nonfamily CEOs. A Wald test shows that the difference between the coefficients on Founder-CEO
and Descendant-CEO is not statistically significant, indicating that founder-CEOs in family firms
are no less likely to undertake divestitures than descendant-CEOs in these companies.
Among the control variables, CEO turnover events and firm age are both positively
associated with firms’ divestiture propensities (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Hambrick et al.,
1993; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002). Moreover, larger companies and firms that are more highly
levered, cash constrained, unprofitable, acquisitive, and diversified are more likely to undertake
divestitures (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Markides, 1992, 1995), as are companies that are
experiencing higher growth in their primary industries (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et al.,
2001; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Berry, 2010).
The Relationship between Divestitures and Firm Value in Family Firms
To estimate the second-stage regressions in coarsened exact matching models, the logistic
regression predicting a firm’s propensity to undertake a divestiture (Regression (1) in Table V)
must first be re-estimated using coarsened values of the independent variables, in order to
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accurately group firms that share similar values of these variables. More specifically, the three
indicator variables that appear in this regression (Family Firm, CEO Turnover, and Negative Net
Income) are each coarsened into two groups (i.e., family and non-family firms; firms that do and
do not change CEOs; and firms that do and do not have negative net income). Diversification is
coarsened into six sub-groups (single-segment firms, firms that have two or three segments;
firms that have four or five segments; firms that have six to eight segments; firms that have nine
to fifteen segments; and firms that have sixteen or more segments). The remaining six variables
(Firm Age, ln(Total Sales), Leverage, Current Ratio, Number of M&A, and Industry Sales
Growth) are coarsened into quintiles based on their distributions.9
Firms’ predicted propensities to undertake divestitures, as derived from the output of this
coarsened first-stage regression, are then incorporated into a second-stage regression. This
second-stage regression estimates the relationship between divestitures and firm value, and the
(un-coarsened) observations are weighted according to the prominence of each stratum into
which they fall. Un-coarsened values of the independent variables are also included in the
second-stage regression to account for any remaining imbalance. The dependent variable in these
regressions is the first-differenced value of Tobin’s q, defined as Qt – Qt-1, which again soaks up
the effects of time-invariant, firm-specific characteristics on the relationship between divestitures
and firm value (Heckman et al., 1998). Table VI presents the results of these regressions.10
-----Table VI here----In Regression (1), the coefficient on Divestiture is positive, although not significant.
Regression (2) estimates this same second-stage regression for the subset of family firms only,

9

We implement coarsened exact matching in Stata using Blackwell et al.’s (2009) “cem” code. As described above,
we initially selected the values on which to coarsen the independent variables. Our results are unchanged if we allow
Stata to choose the values on which to coarsen the independent variables in the first-stage regression.
10
These results are also robust to the use of three alternate dependent variables: ROA, ROS, and ROE.
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while Regression (3) does so for the subset of non-family firms. In Regression (2), the
coefficient on Divestiture is positive and significant, suggesting that the Tobin’s q of family
firms that undertake divestitures is higher by 0.17 (about 11% of the mean value of Tobin’s q)
than that of family firms that do not undertake divestitures. By contrast, the coefficient on the
Divestiture variable is not significant in Regression (3), meaning that firm value does not differ
depending on whether or not non-family firms undertake divestitures. These two models are
simultaneously estimated, and a Wald test of the equality of these two coefficients on the
Divestiture variable is rejected at 1%, providing support for Hypothesis 1.
Regressions (4) and (5) estimate the relationship between divestitures and firm value for
family firms that are managed by family-CEOs versus non-family CEOs. In Regression (4), the
positive and significant coefficient on Divestiture means that the Tobin’s q of family-CEO firms
that undertake divestitures is about 0.20 higher (13% of mean Tobin’s q) than that of familyCEO firms that do not undertake divestitures. By contrast, in Regression (5), the coefficient on
Divestiture is not significant, suggesting a null relationship between divestitures and Tobin’s q in
family firms managed by non-family CEOs. A Wald test of the equality of the two coefficients
on the Divestiture variable is rejected at 5%, providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Regressions (6) and (7) estimate the relationship between divestitures and firm value for
family-CEO firms that are managed by founder- versus descendant-CEOs. In Regression (6), the
coefficient on Divestiture is positive and significant, suggesting that when family firms that are
led by founder-CEOs undertake divestitures, their Tobin’s q is higher (by about 16% of its mean)
than the Tobin’s q of their non-divesting counterparts. The coefficient on the Divestiture variable
is not significant in Regression (7), meaning that firm value does not differ depending on
whether or not family firms run by descendant-CEOs undertake divestitures. A Wald test of the
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equality of these coefficients is rejected at 5%, indicating that divestitures in family-CEO firms
are more positively associated with Tobin’s q in founder-led than descendant-led companies.
Event Study Results
In addition to our coarsened exact matching models, we also run an event study to
quantify the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family and non-family firms.
Because event studies measure investors’ immediate reaction to divestiture announcements, any
differences in the stock market’s response to the divestitures undertaken by family and nonfamily firms should not be driven by ex ante differences in these firms’ characteristics, since
these are all accounted for in the calculation of these firms’ “normal” stock market returns.
To run this event study, we first identified the announcement dates of all of the
divestitures in our sample using SDC Platinum, and we collected from CRSP the daily stock
returns within 250-day estimation windows [-800, -551] before these announcement dates. From
there, we predicted these firms’ normal returns from their daily stock returns and the stock
market’s returns, and then their abnormal returns within three-day event windows [-1, +1]
surrounding the announcement dates (Anand and Singh, 1997). Cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) are the cumulative sum of these abnormal returns over this three-day window.11
Table VII presents our univariate event study results. Panel A reveals that overall,
investors react favorably to divestitures: the CAR to announcements of these transactions are
+0.7%, statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance.
In Panel B of Table VII, the CAR to divestitures undertaken by family firms (+1.0%) is
significantly greater than the CAR to divestitures undertaken by non-family firms (+0.6%),
providing support for Hypothesis 1. While Panel C reveals that there is no statistical difference in
11

Our results will be presented on the basis of these estimation [-800, -551] and event [-1, +1] windows, though they
are invariant to the use of an alternate estimation window [-515, -366], and to the use of several other event windows ([-1, 0], [0, +1], [-2, +2], and [-3, +3]) with both estimation windows.
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the CAR to divestiture announcements undertaken by family- and non-family-CEOs in family
firms, the CAR of family-CEO divestitures (+1.2%) is larger than the CAR of non-family-CEO
divestitures (+0.9%). Finally, Panel D indicates that investors react more favorably to
divestitures undertaken by founder-CEOs (+1.5%) than descendant-CEOs (+0.6%).
As a further extension of these findings, Table VIII presents the results of multivariate
regressions that take the above-described CAR as their dependent variable. These regressions are
estimated as ordinary least squares models with robust standard errors.
In Regression (1), the positive and significant coefficient on Family Firm indicates that
the stock market responds more favorably to announcements of divestitures undertaken by
family firms than it does to divestiture announcements made by non-family firms. This
coefficient estimate reveals that the average difference in the returns earned by these two types
of companies is about +0.4%, consistent with the above-described univariate results.
In Regression (2), the coefficient on Family-CEO is not significant, suggesting that there
is no statistical difference in the stock market’s response to divestitures undertaken by family
firms that are run by family-CEOs versus non-family-CEOs, as in the univariate results.
Similarly, in Regression (3), the coefficient on Founder-CEO is not significant, meaning that
there is no statistical difference in the stock market’s reaction to divestitures undertaken by
family-CEO firms that are run by founder-CEOs versus descendant-CEOs.
-----Tables VII and VIII here----Summary and Interpretation of Results
We have used two different methodologies to test our hypotheses: coarsened exact
matching models with a first-differenced dependent variable, and event studies. Under both
methodologies, family firm divestitures are more positively associated with stock market
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performance than non-family firm divestitures, providing strong support for Hypothesis 1. Under
the coarsened exact matching models, but not the event study, the divestitures undertaken by
family-managed firms are significantly more positively associated with firm value than those
undertaken by non-family-managed firms, providing some evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.
As mentioned previously, the fact that we find support for our hypotheses using these
restrictive methodologies, which rule out the potentially confounding effects of observable and
unobservable firm-specific characteristics on the relationship between divestitures and firm
value, implies that the family-specific preferences to avoid divestitures are the core mechanism
that is driving our results. Figures I and II provide further evidence in support of this point. In
these charts, the average CAR to divestiture announcements is disaggregated according to the
generation of the family firm (in Figure I) or the family-CEO (in Figure II) that undertook each
divestiture. Both figures reveal that the mean CAR to divestitures declines in the generation of
the firm or the CEO that is undertaking these deals. These findings provide further evidence that
family-specific preferences to avoid undertaking divestitures are the core driver of the greater
value creation associated with family and family-CEO divestitures,12 since earlier-generation
founding families and family managers, which are arguably the most closely connected to their
firms, appear to enjoy the greatest economic gains from the divestitures they undertake.
-----Figures I and II here-----

12

One important potential alternative explanation for this pattern of results could simply be that managerial capabilities diminish in the generation of a family firm or a family-CEO. Indeed, there is evidence from previous studies that
founders contribute positively to firms’ market value, while descendants do not (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, because the results presented in Figures I and II are derived using the event study methodology, any stock
market premium in recognition of founders’ capabilities (or discount for the presumed lack of such capabilities in
heirs) is netted out, by construction, in the measure of cumulative abnormal returns. This suggests that the pattern of
results appearing in these figures can reasonably be interpreted to reflect family-specific preferences to avoid divestitures as the core driver of the greater value creation associated with these deals in family- and family-CEO firms.
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Conclusion
This paper has investigated the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family
firms. Consistent with findings from existing research, we first establish that family firms are
significantly less likely than non-family firms to divest businesses, particularly in familymanaged firms. More importantly, we find that the divestitures undertaken by family firms are
associated with significantly higher firm value than divestitures undertaken by non-family firms.
This improvement in post-divestiture performance is pronounced when family firms run by
family-CEOs, rather than non-family CEOs, undertake these transactions.
The key theoretical contribution of this study is to show that because family firms may
pursue objectives beyond the simple maximization of shareholder value, they may not fully
exploit the economic opportunities available to them. Agency theory suggests that family firms,
especially those that are family-managed, will seek not only to maximize value for their
shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932), but also to accommodate their founding families’ unique
preferences (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Burkart et al., 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). As a
result, family firms should be, and are, less likely than their non-family counterparts to undertake
divestitures. However, when family firms do divest business units, overcoming the familyspecific inertia against these transactions, the divestitures they undertake appear to create more
value than those implemented by non-family firms. Thus, the “principal-principal” agency
problem that is known to exist between family and non-family shareholders in family firms
appears to manifest itself in these companies’ corporate strategy decisions and outcomes.
On a related note, another important theoretical contribution of this study is that it helps
to address the questions of when and for which firms divestitures create value. Divestitures are
generally thought to be positively associated with firm performance (Lee and Madhavan, 2010;
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Brauer and Wiersema, 2012). However, research has begun to nuance that view by investigating
the circumstances in which or the types of divestitures for which this might or might not be true
(e.g., Feldman, 2014). This study supplements this effort by showing that the positive
relationship between divestitures and firm value is concentrated among family firms, especially
those that are family-managed, suggesting that the characteristics of the owners and managers of
divesting firms influence the magnitude of the benefits they derive from divestitures.
Furthermore, even though divestitures often create a great deal of value, they are
undertaken significantly less frequently than their scope-expanding counterparts, mergers and
acquisitions, and are often portrayed quite negatively to both internal and external constituents
(Dranikoff et al., 2002). The prevalence of family firms in both the American and global
economies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Villalonga and
Amit, 2010) could explain this pair of stylized facts, in that this study has established that it is
family firms, rather than their non-family counterparts, that are simultaneously the ones that
could derive the greatest benefit from using, but are least likely to use divestitures as an active
part of their corporate strategies. Thus, the research in this paper highlights the idea that
divestitures are a highly underutilized, though potentially very valuable, corporate strategy. A
stream of research has begun considering the role of divestitures as an active part of portfolio
reconfiguration strategies (e.g., Capron et al., 2001; Capron and Mitchell, 2012). This study
further underscores the importance of these transactions, with clear practical implications for
how corporations could be managed more effectively.
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Table I. Family Ownership, Control, and Management
Firm-year pairs
in which the firm
is managed by:
Founder-CEO
Descendant-CEO
Non-Family CEO
Total

Family Firm’s Generation
First

Second

Third

Fourth

Fifth or
More

Total

5,934
7
3,872
9,813

1,021
1,129
1,274
3,424

2
500
526
1,028

0
288
302
590

0
72
94
166

6,957
1,996
6,068
15,021
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Table II. Divestiture Activity
All Firms
Number
Value
3.68
1,630.05
(7.81)
(7,699.18)
3.57
1,249.62
(7.67)
(5,977.61)
0.11
3,397.65
(0.42)
(7,519.71)

Family Firms
Number
Value
2.79
1,067.99
(6.03)
(4,035.04)
2.70
740.62
(5.90)
(2,158.02)
0.09
2,732.43
(0.36)
(6,765.59)

Non-Family Firms
Number
Value
4.58
2,080.42
(9.18)
(9,658.09)
4.45
1,654.93
(9.03)
(7,753.00)
0.12
3,997.70
(0.47)
(7,450.09)

t-statistic (Fam vs. Non-Fam)
Number
Value
5.16***
2.11**

Family-CEO
Number
Value
2.33
956.81
(5.36)
(3,956.54)
2.26
667.11
(5.25)
(2,009.37)
0.07
2,698.10
(0.33)
(6,589.53)

Founder-CEO
Number
Value
2.02
939.56
(5.09)
(4,124.50)
1.96
649.04
(4.99)
(2,064.05)
0.07
2,825.57
(0.34)
(6,947.73)

Descendant-CEO
Number
Value
3.39
997.42
(6.07)
(3,531.15)
3.31
709.30
(5.96)
(1,875.69)
0.08
2,433.29
(0.28)
(5,789.18)

Non-Family-CEO
Number
Value
4.26
1,850.80
(8.58)
(8,566.59)
4.14
1,440.54
(8.43)
(6,780.36)
0.12
3,611.87
(0.45)
(7,314.26)

Divestitures

Fam vs. Non-Fam CEO
Number
Value
3.08***
0.70

Found vs. Non-Fam CEO
Number
Value
3.79***
0.68

Desc vs. Non-Fam CEO
Number
Value
0.08
0.41

Sell-Offs

3.04***

3.75***

Panel A: Average Total Number/Value of:
Divestitures
Sell-Offs
Spinoffs

Panel B: Average Total Number/Value of:
Divestitures
Sell-Offs
Spinoffs

Panel C: t-statistics between

0.87

0.88

0.04

Spinoffs
2.02**
0.04
2.04**
(0.03)
0.85
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
Averages computed over 17-year panel (1994-2010) for each firm. Value of divestitures in $000. t-statistics clustered by firm.
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0.43
0.13

5.14***

2.44**

1.94*

0.94

Table III. Descriptions of Key Variables
Family Variables

Description

Family Firm

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm's founder or a descendant of the founder is an owner, a director, or an officer of the firm

Family-CEO

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm's CEO is a family member

Founder-CEO

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm's CEO is its founder

Descendant-CEO

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm's CEO is a family member different from the founder

Divestiture Variable

Description

Divestiture

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has divested at least one business in a given year,
equal to 0 if the firm has divested no businesses in that year

Other Variables

Description

Tobin's Q

Ratio of a firm's market to book value

CEO Turnover

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm changes CEOs in a given year

Firm Age

Number of years elapsed since a firm's founding

ln(Total Sales)

Natural log of a firm's total sales

Leverage

Ratio of a firm's total debt to value

Current Ratio

Ratio of a firm's current assets to current liabilities

Negative Net Income

Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has negative net income

Diversification

Count of the number of business segments in which a firm operates in a given year

Number of M&A

Count of the number of mergers and acquisitions undertaken by a firm in a given year

Industry Sales Growth

Average sale growth rate of all single-segment companies operating in a firm's primary 4-digit SIC code
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Table IV. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

All Firms

Total Assets ($000)

21,482.76

10,398.31

28,615.85

(76,012.80)

(28,680.53)

(94,012.75)

11,563.35

7,671.36

14,066.31

(26,490.83)

(20,732.02)

(29,340.72)

0.30

0.28

0.31

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

3.34

3.20

3.44

(0.07)

(0.10)

(0.09)

Total Sales ($000)
Leverage
Number of Business Segments
Tobin's q

Family Firms Non-Family Firms t-statistic

1.49

1.49

1.48

(0.15)

(0.23)

(0.20)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
All values measured in the year prior to divestiture activity. t-statistics clustered by firm.
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-3.54***
-3.53***
-2.10**
-1.80*
0.02

Table V. Family Control and the Propensity to Divest
DV: Divestiture
Family Firm

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.174***
(0.064)

Family-CEO

-0.162**
(0.083)

Founder-CEO

-0.145
(0.102)

Descendant-CEO

-0.231**
(0.135)

CEO Turnover

0.260***
(0.064)

(0.212)

(0.212)

Firm Age

0.006***

0.007***

0.006***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

ln(Total Sales)

0.300***

0.268***

0.268***

(0.017)

(0.025)

(0.025)

Leverage

0.403***

0.742***

0.745***

(0.126)

(0.183)

(0.183)

Current Ratio

-0.106***

-0.076**

-0.076**

(0.024)

0.040

(0.040)

0.432***

0.478***

0.475***

(0.074)

(0.100)

(0.101)

Diversification

0.125***

0.140***

0.140***

(0.017)

(0.024)

(0.024)

Number of M&A

0.150***

0.152***

0.152***

(0.020)

(0.025)

(0.025)

Industry Sales Growth

0.010***

0.022**

0.022**

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.011)

-4.125***

-4.220***

-4.226***

(0.146)

(0.211)

(0.210)

All

Family Only

Family Only

Negative Net Income

Constant
Sample of Firms
2

Pseudo-R
Number of Observations

0.371*

0.373*

0.155

0.138

0.138

19,133

10,265

10,265

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
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Table VI. Performance Following Divestitures, Second-Stage Regressions of Coarsened Exact Matching Models
Panel A: All Firms
DV: Qt - Qt-1
Divestiture
Family Firm

Panel B: Family vs. Non-Family Firms

Panel C: Family- vs. Non-Family-CEOs in Family Firms Panel D: Founder- vs. Descendant-CEOs in Family Firms

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.040

0.165**

-0.042

0.201**

0.107

0.244**

0.107

(0.041)

(0.076)

(0.068)

(0.100)

(0.085)

(0.121)

(0.085)

-0.032
(0.032)

CEO Turnover
Firm Age
ln(Total Sales)
Leverage

0.176***

0.262**

0.091

0.264*

0.199**

0.432**

0.199**

(0.052)

(0.114)

(0.084)

(0.162)

(0.089)

(0.213)

(0.089)

-0.002***

-0.002

-0.002

-0.005***

-0.000

-0.020***

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.001)

-0.104***

-0.090***

-0.121***

-0.078***

-0.116***

-0.068***

-0.116***

(0.010)

(0.028)

(0.035)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.023)

(0.021)

-1.864***

-1.608***

-2.060***

-1.640***

-1.504***

-1.753***

-1.504***
(0.157)

(0.069)

(0.210)

(0.182)

(0.141)

(0.157)

(0.165)

-0.019*

-0.003

-0.035

0.007

-0.022

0.004

-0.023

(0.010)

(0.018)

(0.027)

(0.019)

(0.021)

(0.020)

(0.021)

0.478***

0.424***

0.529***

0.320***

0.530***

0.190*

0.530***

(0.053)

(0.133)

(0.098)

(0.102)

(0.106)

(0.114)

(0.106)

Diversification

-0.083***

-0.059**

-0.100***

-0.030

-0.098***

-0.021

-0.098***

(0.010)

(0.026)

(0.023)

(0.024)

(0.021)

(0.030)

(0.021)

Number of M&A

0.073***

0.027

0.116***

0.034

0.025

-0.002

0.025

(0.015)

(0.035)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.025)

(0.045)

(0.025)

-0.085***

-0.060

-0.104**

-0.015

-0.092**

0.012

-0.092**

(0.021)

(0.040)

(0.046)

(0.052)

(0.039)

(0.057)

(0.039)

-0.289***

-0.566***

-0.040

-0.724***

-0.270

-0.454**

-0.270

(0.086)

(0.199)

(0.309)

(0.157)

(0.173)

(0.179)

(0.173)

Current Ratio
Negative Net Income

Industry Sales Growth
Constant
Sample of Firms
2

R
Number of Observations

All

Family

Non-Family

Family-CEO

Non-Family CEO

Founder-CEO

Descendant-CEO

0.171

0.133

0.205

0.124

0.159

0.161

0.159

14,760

6,649

8,111

3,458

3,191

2,341

1,117

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table VII. Univariate Event Study Results
Panel A. All Firms
CAR
Number of Observations
Panel B. Family vs. Non-Family Firms
CAR
Number of Observations
Panel C. Family-CEOs vs. Non-Family CEOs in Family Firms
CAR
Number of Observations

All Firms
0.007
7,243

t-statistic
3.79***

Family Firms
0.010
2,703

Non-Family Firms
0.006
4,540

t-statistic
2.86***

Family-CEO Firms Non-Family CEO Firms
0.012
0.009
1,277
1,426

t-statistic
0.87

Panel D. Founder-CEOs vs. Descendant-CEOs in Family Firms Founder-CEO Firms Descendant-CEO Firms
CAR
0.015
0.006
Number of Observations
831
446
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

t-statistic
2.12**
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Table VIII. Multivariate Event Study Results
DV: CAR
Family Firm

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.004***
(0.002)

Family-CEO

-0.001
(0.003)

Founder-CEO

-0.000
(0.006)

CEO Turnover
Firm Age

-0.002

0.000

-0.015*

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.008)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

ln(Total Sales)

-0.003***

-0.005***

-0.006***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Leverage

0.017***

0.023***

0.004

(0.004)

(0.007)

(0.010)

0.002**

0.002*

-0.001
(0.001)

Current Ratio
Negative Net Income
Diversification
Number of M&A
Industry Sales Growth
Constant

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.007***

0.014***

0.011*

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.007)

-0.000

0.000

0.001

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.000

-0.001

-0.001

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

-0.001

0.003

0.016**

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.008)

Sample of Firms
2

R
Number of Observations

All

Family Only

Family-CEO Only

0.016

0.022

0.041

5,340

2,078

909

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure I. Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Firm Generation
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Figure II. Cumulative Abnormal Returns by CEO Generation
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